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Abstract— Privately initiated food quality standards 
are currently important elements in the marketing of 
food and agricultural products. At the same time, they 
stand in the centre of a discussion about potential 
negative effects on small farmers and farmers in 
developing countries. This study aims at analysing the 
adoption of two private food standards, BRC Technical 
Food Standard and GlobalGAP, at an aggregated cross-
country level. The results of the econometric analysis 
reveal some (potential) barriers for developing countries 
to access this type of organisational innovation. 
Certificates seem to be issued more probably in larger 
and wealthier countries, countries with a better 
institutional quality, better infrastructural conditions 
and in former UK colonies. 
Keywords— standards, food quality, adoption. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In his presidential address to the IAAE, von Braun 
[1] calls attention to the emergence of privately driven 
food quality standards and the various new research 
topics coming up with this development. Private, 
mainly retailer driven, food quality standards are 
mainly based on the definition of certain process 
characteristics like production conditions or 
traceability. However, the coverage in terms of 
products and type of prescriptions varies substantially 
across the various standards. Critics focus on a 
potential increase of market protection of Western 
European countries’ agricultural and food markets. 
This might be especially relevant for standards which 
require part of the production in special regions or 
countries, like Red Tractor or regional marketing 
initiatives. In addition, there are fears that only 
selected groups of farmers are able to comply with 
those standards. Inequality between farmers within 
countries could increase and, eventually, result in a 
bifurcation of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, for 
farmers in developing countries, food quality 
standards might represent an increasing implicit 
market barrier for entering the global food chain 
because they lack the technical capacity to either 
produce the same quality as Western European 
countries or if they do, to prove that they provide 
equivalent quality. These arguments result in the 
concern that especially small farmers and/ or farmers 
in developing countries might be excluded from 
Western European export markets due to non-
compliance with standards [2, 3]. Certain authors even 
raise the question if retailer dominated standards lead 
to a type of re-colonialisation [4]. On the contrary, 
consumers could benefit from positive spill-over on 
domestic markets in developing countries due to an 
increasing demand for higher food safety and food 
quality from export markets. However, a complete 
cost-benefit analysis of private food standards would 
go far beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this 
paper aims at focusing on producers’ access to those 
standards and determinants of their global spread. The 
global spread is modelled as this technology’s 
adoption process by defining standards as a clearly 
defined technology. We further argue that the global 
spread of a certain standard could be modelled 
theoretically as any other technological innovation. 
So far, existing literature evolving around these new 
types of governance structures focuses especially on 
the effects on small farmers in developing countries 
discussing mainly case studies or single countries (e.g. 
[5, 6, 7, 8]) as well as their impact on trade flows [9]. 
Looking at the other side of the food supply chain, 
Fulponi [10] describes incentives of retailers in OECD 
countries to set up such privately organised and to a 
large extent business-to-business standards. The 
author underlines the special importance of legal 
liability rules, transaction costs, improvement of 
retailer’s reputation and flexibility in choosing 
suppliers as drivers of retailers’ interest to establish 
international standards. However, available literature 
on evaluating private quality standards’ impact on 
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agricultural trade and sectoral development is limited. 
Burrell et al. [11, 12] present an overview of the 
various studies in this field. Analyses of standard’s 
adoption at farm/firm level focuses almost exclusively 
on ISO standards and HACCP tools. Previous studies 
concentrate on one or two countries and certain 
agricultural sectors (e.g. [13, 14, 15, 16]). 
Thus, they fall short in analysing the spread of 
private standards on a global scale. Generally, Burrell 
et al. [11] criticise the mainly descriptive character of 
previous analyses. However, to be able to derive 
conclusions if certain countries might be excluded 
from modern food chains this perspective seems 
relevant. Beyond this background, in this paper we 
start from the somehow normative expectation that 
producers in every country should have a fair access to 
standards after controlling for geographical conditions 
(e.g. distance to European export market), and 
historical trade relations. The number of certified 
firms in each country is the relevant proxy for the 
standard’s global spread. The aggregated adoption of 
private food standards is explained in this paper by 
socio-economic and geographic variables. 
Our approach faces the major criticism that firms 
comply with standards and not countries. 
Subsequently, the appropriate level of analysis would 
be to use firm-level data. However, those are not 
publicly available and surveys in every country would 
not be feasible. The same data problem applies to the 
produced output under certification which would give 
a better indication of the standard’s economic 
importance within the agricultural and food sector. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. After giving 
a short literature review, the data are introduced in 
chapter II. The results of the econometric analysis are 
presented in chapter III, followed by a conclusion 
(chapter IV). 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES AND DATA 
DESCRIPTION  
Private standards are defined as voluntary 
regulations established by non-governmental 
organisations. Burrell et al. [12] present an overview 
of various recently emerged food standards and 
Quality Assurance Systems. Our study focuses on 
food standards with global relevance. Therefore, we 
select the two most prominent examples, BRC Food 
Technical Standard and GlobalGAP, to analyse the 
spread of retailer food quality standards from an 
international perspective. Both standards started in 
1997/98 and have today certified producers in more 
than 60 countries on all continents. Whereas the first 
standard is directed towards processors, the second 
one is targeted at farm level. Both are in-chain 
standards, not communicated to the consumer via 
labels on the product. 
The theoretical approaches to explain the diffusion 
of organisational innovations are reviewed for instance 
in Guler et al. [17] as well as Neumayer and Perkins 
[18]. The hypotheses underlying this study’s 
econometric analysis are derived from this theory and 
are in most cases very similar to the knowledge about 
determinants of technology diffusion [19]. The 
theoretical background is presented more extensively 
in the extended version of this contribution [20]. 
Comin and Hobijn [19] show evidence that speed of 
adoption of several technologies is driven by a handful 
of the same factors. For example Neumayer and 
Perkins [18] explain the diffusion/ adoption of ISO 
9000 certification. Their study shows the statistical 
significance of measures of trade intensity linking 
countries to the wider global community to explain 
diffusion and adoption of this standard. The share of 
exports to the EU and Japan on country’s GDP, stocks 
of foreign direct investment (FDI), historical colonial 
ties to Europe and the availability of 
telecommunication drive significantly the number of 
ISO 9000 certificates per country. Guler et al. [17] link 
the diffusion of ISO 9000 to the level of inward FDI, 
GDP per capita and size of the labour force.  
For analysing the global spread of private standards, 
the variable of interest is the number of firms certified 
in a certain country. This information is sampled from 
online databases published by the respective provider 
of the following standards: BRC Food Technical 
Standard and GlobalGAP. All data base on the cut off 
date November 2007. 
Various explanatory variables are included in the 
econometric analysis. Descriptive statistics and 
sources of the data are listed in Table 1. The 
explanatory variables are classified into three broad 
groups. First, we control for historical and 
geographical conditions. Mitchener and Weidenmier 
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[21] show a significant impact of colonial history on 
trade flows. Distance to the standard’s home country 
should capture costs of transportation. The second set 
consists of variables of infrastructure and sector 
conditions. Infrastructure will affect distribution of 
standards in two ways. Obviously, production for 
export purposes requires provision of transport 
infrastructure like roads and railways. Additionally, 
the above discussed standards are rather complex 
innovations, compared to other agricultural 
innovations like seeds, fertilizer or machinery. 
Information processing and distribution seem to be a 
critical prerequisite for adoption. Page and Slater [22], 
for instance, highlight the limited availability of 
commercial consultancies in developing countries’ 
agriculture. Therefore, we control for the existence of 
a certified auditor in the respective country. The origin 
of GlobalGAP is linked to trade in fresh fruit and 
vegetables. Consequently, we expect to observe more 
certified firms in countries with a relatively high fruit 
and vegetable production per agricultural population. 
To reduce the influence of outstanding years, the 
average of the years 1995-2000 is used. There could 
be concern about a possible endogeneity of this 
variable as certification can lead to more trade and 
increasing production. However, all standards are 
introduced after 1998 and it is argued that possible 
trade intensification, if any significant increase will 
take place, would show up with some time lag, i.e., 
well after the year 2000. Finally, the third group of 
variables controls for some general characteristics of 
the business environment. The so-called rule of law 
serves as a proxy of the quality of institutions. The 
variable gives an indication of perceptions of the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts. GDP per capita is included 
to capture endowment differences across countries that 
are omitted in the other variables like human capital. 
Interaction effects control for a potentially different 
access of farmers in transition and developing 
countries to certification. We follow the argumentation 
of Comin and Hobijn [19] that the explanation of the 
adoption of (micro-)technologies by considering 
overall macroeconomic factors reduces possible 
simultaneous bias. Obviously, it seems to be 
unrealistic to expect an effect of food standard 
adoption at farm level on total agricultural trade, 
infrastructure or even GDP. 
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics and sources of variables 
Variable Description Mean Source 
Dependent variables 
GAP Country has at least one certified producer under 
GlobalGAP standard [%] 
0.443 GlobalGAP 
GAP-NOPC Certified producers of GlobalGAP [No. per 1000 
inhabitants] 
0.030 GlobalGAP 
BRC Country has at least one certified producer under BRC 
Technical Food Standard [%] 
0.432 BRC 
BRC-NOPC Certified producers of BRC Technical Food Standard 
[No. per 1000 inhabitants] 
0.002 BRC 
Historical and geographical conditions 
COLONY Former UK colony [1 – yes, 0 – no] 0.292 CIA 
DIST Distance to UK (BRC) or NL (GlobalGAP) [km] 6352.62 
6172.70 
Own calculation 
POP Population [in million] 33.328 [24], CIA 
Infrastructure and sector  conditions 
FVPPCP Fruit and vegetable production  
[kg per agricultural population] 
1841.31 FAO 
AUDIT Existence of domestic auditor  
[1 – yes, 0 – no] 
0.375 (BRC) 
0.151 (GAP) 
GlobalGAP, BRC 
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Table 1 cont. 
Business environment 
LAW Rule of law 4.869 [23] 
LGDPpc Log of GDP per capita 7.740 [24], CIA 
TRANS*LGDPpc Interaction effect LGDPpc and transition country 7.536 [24] 
LOWINC*LGDPpc Interaction effect LGDPpc and low income country 6.532 [24] 
MIDINC*LGDPpc Interaction effect LGDPpc and upper middle income country 8.653 [24] 
 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF THE 
ANALYSIS 
The above described data encompasses two 
different aspects of the spread of private standards. 
The existence of certified firms within a country is a 
binary variable and the number of certified suppliers 
per country is a count variable. This type of data 
characteristics is called incidental truncation by 
Greene [25]. However, for every standard the 
distribution of certified firms is highly positively 
skewed and many countries have no certified firm at 
all. A second observation reveals, see table 2, that 
certificates of both standards are issued in many 
countries in parallel. Therefore, a bivariate probit 
model (Eq. 1) is used to explain the existence of 
certificates and controls for the independence of both 
standards.  
 111 iii xz εβ +′=  yi1=1 if zi1>0, yi1=0 otherwise, 
(1) 222 iii xz εβ +′= , yi2=1 if zi2>0, yi2=0 otherwise, 
[ 21, ii εε ] ~ bivariate normal (BVN) [0,0,1,1,ρ].  
The parameters β and ρ have to be estimated. Latter 
controls for a correlation of the two error terms. 
Subsequently, a Tobit estimator (Eq. 2) is used to 
explain the number of certificates within countries. 
Due to space constraints and the well-established 
nature of these two estimators their details are omitted 
here. Greene [25], for example, provides further 
information.  
iii xz εβ +′= , yi=0 if zi≤0, yi=zi otherwise (2) 
Table 2 shows the distribution of certified 
producers, as of Fall 2007, according to their 
continent. Only independent and internationally 
recognised countries are included. With respect to the 
distributed certificates, the two European standards 
show a dominating concentration on European 
countries. GlobalGAP reaches a higher number of 
producers worldwide. The countries with the highest 
number of GlobalGAP certificates are Spain and Italy, 
both more than 12,000, and Greece with more than 
8000. As expected the United Kingdom leads the list 
of BRC certificates with more than 2000 followed by 
Italy with nearly 800. Interestingly, America follows 
on the second place in the case of GlobalGAP and 
Asia in the case of BRC. The first standard has more 
than 1,000 certified firms in Chile and Argentina and 
close to 1,000 in Peru. Thus, these three countries 
account for more than half of the issued certificates in 
North and Latin America (exactly 56.3%). The BRC 
standard is especially widespread in the Asian 
countries China and Thailand, again accounting for 
nearly two-third of all certificates issued in Asia 
(exactly 65%). In terms of per capita counts, issued 
certificates per 1000 inhabitants, mainly smaller 
European countries and New Zealand lead the list for 
both standards. 
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Table 2 Distribution of GlobalGAP and BRC certified producers worldwide 
 Europe America Oceania Asia Africa World 
Number of countries  44 36 14 45 53 192 
GlobalGAP 
Countries with cert. 31 21 2 16 19 89 
Share of countries  70.45 52.78 14.29 31.11 35.85 44.27 
Number of cert. 56558 6272 1993 3044 3375 71242 
Share of total cert. 79.39 8.80 2.80 4.27 4.74  
BRC Technical Food Standard 
Countries with cert. 29 10 3 15 10 67 
Share of countries 65.91 27.78 21.43 33.33 18.87 34.90 
Number of cert. 6085 167 155 566 197 7170 
Share of total cert. 84.87 2.33 2.16 7.89 2.75  
Note:  cert. - certificates 
Source:  Own computation 
 
A similar picture as indicated above emerges from 
the look on the distribution of certified producers over 
all countries. Although many countries have at least 
one certified firm, only a handful of countries 
represents larger groupings (i.e. more than 100) of 
certified firms. The box plots in Figure 1 illustrate this 
observation over all countries. The median is 8 
certified firms regarding the BRC and 51 in the case of 
GlobalGAP. 75% of the countries with any certified 
firm (upper border of the boxes) represent 48 (BRC) 
and 392 (GlobalGAP) firms, respectively. Within the 
group of transition countries group, China ranks with 
256 BRC certificates first. With respect to 
GlobalGAP, the first place is taken by Hungary (641).  
Table 3 presents the results of the econometric 
analysis, the first two columns contain the results of 
the bivariate probit followed by the results of the Tobit 
model. As mentioned above, the probit model 
measures the existence of any certified farm or firm 
and controls for a joint existence of both standards in 
one country. The Tobit model presents evidence of the 
spread of certification within the respective country. 
Generally, the presented specifications explain the 
aggregated adoption of both standards quite 
satisfactorily. 
1
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1500
2500
5000
10000
Distribution of certificates per country
BRC GlobalGAP
Fig. 1 Distribution of certificates per country 
Source:  Own computation 
In the case of the bivariate probit, the cross-
equation correlation is statistically significant. Thus, 
countries with a GlobalGAP certified farm have a 
statistically significant positive probability to be home 
of BRC certified firms, too. 
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Table 3 Estimation results 
 Bivariate Probit Tobit 
Dependent variable GAP BRC GAP-NOPC BRC-NOPC 
Historical and geographical conditions 
COLONY -0.228 
(-0.89) 
0.248 
(0.86) 
-0.009 
(-0.24) 
0.004 
(2.28)** 
DIST -0.0001 
(-1.53) 
-0.0001 
(-1.73)* 
-7.66*E-06 
(-1.51) 
-4.72*E-07 
(-2.13)** 
POP 0.015 
(4.00)*** 
0.026 
(5.00)*** 
0.00009 
(0.89) 
-1.83*E-07 
(-0.04) 
Infrastructure and sector conditions 
ROADS -0.104 
(-0.91) 
-0.242 
(-1.90)* 
0.061 
(3.89)*** 
-0.0002 
(-0.39) 
FVPPCP 0.0001 
(2.28)** 
2.88*E-07  
(0.01) 
0.00002 
(3.23)*** 
-1.47*E-07 
(-0.55) 
AUDIT   0.143 
(3.04)*** 
0.008 
(4.28)*** 
Business environment 
LAW 0.221 
(2.34)** 
0.439 
(3.91)*** 
0.029 
(1.96)* 
0.001 
(2.11)** 
LGDPpc   -0.332 
(-3.69)*** 
0.006 
(2.12)** 
TRANS -1.314 
(-0.54) 
-8.372 
(-2.08)** 
-2.865 
(-3.07)*** 
0.056 
(1.60) 
TRANS*LGDPpc 0.246 
(0.81) 
1.137 
(2.14)** 
0.289 
(3.02)*** 
-0.006 
(-1.64) 
LOWINC -1.273 
(-0.93) 
-5.068 
(-2.94)*** 
-3.158 
(-3.49)*** 
0.047 
(1.45) 
LOWINC*LGDPpc 0.292 
(1.72)* 
0.679 
(3.10)*** 
0.338 
(3.66)*** 
-0.0005 
(-1.39) 
MIDINC 6.621 
(0.97) 
-10.765 
(-1.43) 
-3.812 
(-3.01)*** 
0.028 
(0.56) 
MIDINC*LGDPpc -0.708 
(-0.91) 
1.221 
(1.43) 
0.410 
(3.00)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.50) 
Constant -1.736 
(-2.08)** 
-1.971 
(-2.08)** 
2.903 
(3.26)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.29)** 
Rho  0.691***   
N 183 183 185 
Censored/ uncensored   101/ 82 103/ 82 
Wald/ LR (df) 83.13 (24)*** 75.82 (14)*** 118.95 (14)*** 
AIC 366.95 61.64 -485.37 
Note:  Z-values (Bivariate probit) and t-values (Tobit) are displayed in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source:  Own computation 
 
Turning to the estimated coefficients, Table 3 
reveals that historical conditions and distance seems to 
be more important in the case of BRC. The fact 
whether a country was a UK colony or not has a 
significant positive effect on the number of BRC 
certified companies in the Tobit model suggesting that 
former UK colonies have a higher probability of 
having more companies being BRC certified. Our 
result is comparable to findings by Neumayer and 
Perkins [18], where the time length of colonial status 
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increases the number of ISO 9000 certificates. 
Similarly, the distance to the UK has a significant 
negative impact on the probability to find at least one 
BRC certified firm in a country as well as the number 
of BRC certificates. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant at conventional levels with 
respect to GlobalGAP. 
For both standards the coefficient for population 
(POP) shows a significant positive effect on the 
probability to have at least one certified farm/ firm in 
one country but has no impact on the number of 
certified firms. This result suggests a tendency of 
concentration of participation in global standards in 
larger countries. However, our results contradict 
conclusions by Neumayer and Perkins [18] who find 
significantly more ISO 9000 certifications per 
inhabitant in larger countries. It could be argued that 
their result suffers from the missing control for sample 
selection. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable AUDIT 
suggests a significant positive impact of the existence 
of an auditor in a certain country on the number of 
certified firms in that country. This result appears for 
both standards and is quite robust. It proves the 
hypothesis stated above, the availability of domestic 
auditors might facilitate the adoption of the respective 
standard. Furthermore, we can state that the estimated 
coefficient of the variable FVPPCP suggests a 
significant positive impact of production of fruit and 
vegetables in a certain country on the existence and 
number of GlobalGAP certified firms in that country. 
It highlights the targeting of certification on countries 
with a specialised or intense production of fruits and 
vegetables. Especially GlobalGAP started with 
standards for fresh vegetables. It would be promising 
for future studies to analyse whether a specialisation in 
any other food category also influences the food 
standard certification.  
The variable LAW has significant positive effects 
for countries, i.e. firms, being certified. The results 
suggest that in countries with a higher acceptance of 
legal rules and laws companies are with a significantly 
higher probability certified at all (probit model) and 
furthermore, a significantly larger number of firms 
obtained certification (Tobit model). Hence, a better 
institutional environment helps firms to take 
advantage of modern organisational innovations.  
The GDP per capita variable displays a significant 
negative coefficient in the Tobit model for GlobalGAP 
and a positive coefficient in the Tobit model for BRC 
certificates after controlling for country groups like 
low and middle income countries. Hence, the different 
target groups of GlobalGAP and BRC certification 
seem to be opposing each other. The number of 
GlobalGAP certified farms decreases with the GDP 
per capita and the number of BRC certified firms 
increases. However, the controls for the different 
country groups reveal also a significant heterogeneity 
within these groups. Whereas classification as 
transition or low income country lowers the 
probability to have any certified firm, the wealthier 
countries within these groups exhibit significantly 
higher probabilities. Thus, not the pure status as 
transition country or low income country matters. 
Interestingly, it applies for the existence of BRC 
certification but also for the number of GlobalGAP 
certificates. With respect to the existence of BRC 
certificates, the results point to no statistically 
significant difference between middle and high-
income countries. On the contrary, the number of 
GlobalGAP certificates is, following the estimated 
coefficients, highest in the group of high-income 
countries. 
Extending the econometric framework and 
including trade related variables, like the share of 
exports to standard’s home countries on total 
agricultural exports, results in a sharp drop in sample 
size. Many countries without any of the two 
certifications analysed here do not report data to 
international organisations. Additionally, the estimated 
coefficient of the export share is far from being 
statistically significant. One possible extension of the 
econometric analysis would be the inclusion of lagged 
numbers of certificates or even the estimation as panel. 
Unfortunately, data of previous years are currently not 
available. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
This study empirically analyses the global spread of 
retailer driven food standards and possible 
determinants using aggregated cross-country level data 
from GlobalGAP and BRC. Three classes of 
explanatory variables containing historical and 
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geographical characteristics, infrastructure and sector 
conditions, as well as business environment are used 
to explain the existence of certified firms within a 
country and the number of certified suppliers per 
country. 
Our results show no evidence that developing or 
transition countries are systematically excluded from 
retailer driven food standards. However, a 
concentration of certified firms mainly in European 
countries is observed and less wealthier countries face 
a significantly lower probability to be home of at least 
one certified farm or firm. Furthermore, several of our 
findings suggest that farmers in developing or 
transition countries have to overcome certain barriers 
to get certified by a private food standard. Farmers’ 
participation in organisational innovation is negatively 
affected by a poor institutional quality of their country. 
The fact that countries with missing data belong to the 
group of countries without certified producers seems 
to support our findings. Again our results are not 
suited to derive conclusions with respect to the 
characteristics of certified farms and to prove the 
potential exclusion of smallholders. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the number of 
GlobalGAP certified farms decreases with the GDP 
per capita and the number of BRC certified firms 
increases. Whereas classification as transition or low 
income country lowers the probability to have any 
certified firm, the wealthier countries within these 
groups exhibit significantly higher probabilities. Thus, 
for both BRC and GlobalGAP not the pure status as 
transition country or low income country matters.  
Our study leaves room for future applications. It 
remains to be analysed whether a bifurcation of the 
market exists by observing what determines the 
certification process within countries at farm/ firm-
level. Extending the group of explanatory variables 
could help to further explain the global spread of food 
quality standards. With respect to the econometric 
analysis the inclusion of lagged numbers of certificates 
or even the estimation as panel seems to be promising. 
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